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For more than a decade, the United States has performed environmental monitoring
by collecting and analyzing air samples for a handful of biological threat agents
(BTAs) in order to detect a possible biological attack. This effort has faced numerous
technical challenges including timeliness, sampling efficiency, sensitivity, specificity,
and robustness. The cost of city-wide environmental monitoring using conventional
technology has also been a challenge. A large group of scientists with expertise in
bioterrorism defense met to assess the objectives and current efficacy of environmental
monitoring and to identify operational and technological changes that could enhance
its efficacy and cost-effectiveness, thus enhancing its value. The highest priority
operational change that was identified was to abandon the current concept of city-wide
environmental monitoring because the operational costs were too high and its value was
compromised by low detection sensitivity and other environmental factors. Instead, it was
suggested that the focus should primarily be on indoor monitoring and secondarily on
special-event monitoring because objectives are tractable and these operational settings
are aligned with likelihood and risk assessments. The highest priority technological
change identified was the development of a reagent-less, real-time sensor that can
identify a potential airborne release and trigger secondary tests of greater sensitivity
and specificity for occasional samples of interest. This technological change could be
transformative with the potential to greatly reduce operational costs and thereby create
the opportunity to expand the scope and effectiveness of environmental monitoring.
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INTRODUCTION
The release of a BTA as an aerosol has the potential to kill
thousands of individuals (Riedel, 2004; Nicogossian et al., 2011).
The initial phase of an undetected attack would be silent
and unremarkable. Within a few days, however, the surge of
victims and panic could overwhelm an unprepared public health
system (Isukapalli et al., 2008), cripple key infrastructure, and
create economic shockwaves. To avert such disasters in the
United States, a stronger biodefense capability was developed
under the guidance of Homeland Security Presidential Directives
(HSPDs) and Congressional Acts. For example, the 2004 HSPD-
10 identified four pillars of biodefense: (i) threat awareness; (ii)
prevention and protection; (iii) surveillance and detection; and
(iv) response and recovery (HSPD, 2008 ). The pillars emphasized
the need for better global intelligence and interdiction of
efforts to acquire bioweapons, a robust surveillance system
to rapidly detect an attack, and rapid deployment of the
strategic national stockpile and distribution and dispensation of
medical countermeasures to reduce fatalities. The 2004 Bioshield
Act (Jones et al., 2005; Russell, 2007) provided $5.6 billion
to develop, procure, and stockpile Medical Countermeasures
(MCMs) against high-consequence biological agents. Efficient
distribution of the MCMs after an attack could reduce illness and
fatalities, but such execution requires a surveillance system that
can effectively detect, identify, and characterize the BTA and scale
of an attack.
Surveillance for a biological attack currently relies on
a combination of public health/clinical surveillance and
environmental monitoring. Public health/clinical surveillance
involves a combination of syndromic disease surveillance
(Gould et al., 2017; Lall et al., 2017; Mathes et al., 2017;
Ridgway et al., 2017) and conventional reporting of disease to
local or state health departments. The development of FDA-
approved, point-of-care multiplex diagnostics may facilitate
accurate diagnoses and the timely reporting needed to release
MCMs from the National Strategic Stockpile for post-exposure
prophylaxis (Doggett et al., 2016). However, sole reliance on
public health/clinical surveillance averts only a fraction of the
health consequences because of the time delay in recognizing an
attack (Kaufmann et al., 1997; Wein et al., 2003). Even if the first
symptomatic cases resulting from a covert attack are diagnosed
expeditiously, the scale and scope of the exposure event would
be unknown. The scale and impacted area must be determined
to guide the distribution and dispensation of MCMs. When the
number of identified cases surges enough to indicate a large-scale
exposure event, crucial time for consequence management has
been lost. This limitation motivates the use of complementary
environmental monitoring. Environmental monitoring has the
potential to detect an attack prior to disease onset, enabling
accelerated release of appropriate MCMs for post-exposure
prophylaxis and disease mitigation.
The Biowatch program was implemented in 2003 for the
purpose of detecting large-scale biological attacks (Shea and
Lister, 2003; National Academy of Sciences, 2013). It represents
the current state-of-the-art for environmental monitoring of
BTAs. The current program monitors outdoor air at selected
sites for the presence of a subset of BTAs in more than 30 cities
across the U. S. Monitoring involves the collection of airborne
particles on membrane filters over a 24-h period, although
shorter collection periods have been used on occasion. After
collection, the filters are removed and transported to a Biowatch
laboratory for analysis, which consists of the extraction of nucleic
acids followed by semi-quantitative real-time PCR amplification
and detection of target sequences associated with the BTAs of
interest. Based on the current sample processing and testing
scheme, results are generally available between 12 and 36 h
after airborne particles are collected on an air filter. During the
past 12 years of the program’s operation, numerous technical
and operational challenges of city-wide, outdoor bioaerosol
monitoring have become apparent. For example, detection of
a BTA can be problematic due to dilution effects as a plume
of aerosolized material travels and mixes with surrounding air
(Craft et al., 2005; Stuart and Wilkening, 2005; Buckeridge et al.,
2006; Nicogossian et al., 2011). The ability of a given particle
collector to collect an aerosolized agent can also vary widely
because city-wide airflow patterns are highly variable. Changes in
the direction and velocity of wind throughout the day, changing
weather conditions, fluctuation in microclimate conditions in
complex urban landscapes, changes in human activity (e.g.,
traffic) patterns, and associated variability in the background
chemical and biological composition of ambient aerosols (Jones
and Harrison, 2004; Fahlgren et al., 2010; Franzetti et al., 2011;
Bertolini et al., 2013; Bowers et al., 2013) can affect the capture
and detection of agents of concern. These phenomena can
create variation in the probability of sufficient target capture
by individual collectors, underscoring the need for a dense
network of outdoor collectors to reliably detect a biological
attack. Related operational challenges include the cost of labor to
retrieve and transport the captured samples (daily or more often)
from the network of aerosol collectors, transport the samples
to a Biowatch laboratory, and process them for detection of
BTAs. The total operational cost is estimated at >$400/day per
detector (i.e., $87M operation budget for 600 collectors over
365 days) (Person and Currie, 2015). The cost vs. benefit of
the program has been increasingly challenged, which motivates
a re-examination of current approaches for environmental
monitoring.
With this foundation, a panel of 39 subject matter experts
from federal agencies, academia, and industry (participant list
included at the end of this article) met to discuss the current state-
of-the-art technology for 9 h over three consecutive days during
a conference on chemical and biological terrorism defense. The
participants included past and present DHS program managers
tasked with Research and Development to support the Biowatch
program, experts who have contributed in various ways to
environmental monitoring of BTAs over the entire history of
the Biowatch program, and members of other U.S. Government
agencies that have participated in prior assessments of the
Biowatch program. State government end-users of the Biowatch
program did not attend the scientific conference from which
this discussion group was assembled. The discussion group
was tasked with providing recommendations to address three
specific challenges: value and benefit to public health, cost
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TABLE 1 | Detection contexts and modes.
U.S. militarya Civilian
Detect-to-
warn
Detect-to-
treat
Detect-to-
warn
Detect-to-
treat
Objective Minimize
exposure/
Expedite
treatment
Expedite
treatment
Expedite
diagnosis
Expedite
treatment
Time-of-
action-after-
release
Minutes Minutes-to-
hours
1–2 days Multiple days
False alarm
acceptability
Yes Yes Yes No
Population Homogenous
(healthy
young adults)
Heterogenous
(all health
states and
ages)
aDerived from National Research Council (2005).
and sustainability, and probability of detection. The consensus
recommendations from the discussion group include operational
and technological changes that range from incremental to
transformative. Implementing these recommendations could
lead to a more robust and cost-effective environmental
monitoring program.
A crucial starting point was the recognition of two operational
modes for monitoring systems intended to provide early warning
of a biological attack. The two modes are conventionally referred
to as detect-to-warn and detect-to-treat. The two operational
modes were originally defined in the context of warning systems
for U.S. military personnel (National Research Council, 2005).
However, in a civilian environment, a much higher standard
of evidence is required to initiate public health actions. For
example, detect-to-warn in the military context is intended to
allow military personnel to avoid an approaching bioaerosol
cloud or to enable distribution of prophylactic antibiotics to
military personnel when a possible exposure is suspected, but
such actions are unrealistic for civilian populations. Continued
use of the military definitions of biosurveillance operational
modes sets a performance expectation for civilian warning
systems that is difficult or impossible to achieve with the
current technology. Therefore, we redefined the operational
modes for compatibility with a civilian context. Our perspective
of key distinctions between the military and civilian contexts
is outlined in Table 1. Under the definitions for civilian use
that we employ here (detailed below), the two operational
modes for environmental biomonitoring have different evidence
requirements for implementation of public health actions
(Table 2).
The detect-to-warn mode simply alerts public health officials
of a possible large-scale exposure event so that identification
of early cases of illness may be faster and more reliable (i.e.,
the potential for misdiagnosis may be reduced if physicians
are alert for specific BTAs). In the detect-to-warn mode, the
early cases of illness diagnosed through conventional public
TABLE 2 | Evidence standards for early detection modes.
Evidence Detect
to warn
Detect
to treat
AGENT DETECTION
Initial positive + +
Confirmatory positive - same sample,
additional orthologous assays
+ +
Positives from other location(s) – +
AGENT CHARACTERIZATION
Not-near neighbor + +
Not natural occurrence + +
Viable – +
Drug susceptibility – Desired
EVENT CHARACTERIZATION
Approximate exposure area – +
OPERATIONAL CONCLUSION
“Agent detected” + N/A
“Attack highly likely, viable agent, exposure
zone estimated”
N/A +
health channels provide confirmation of an exposure event.
The early cases can also provide additional characterization
of the event and the identification of the potential exposure
zone that can be used to trigger a larger public health
response for soon-to-emerge cases. Detect-to-warn is the easiest
mode to implement. Current environmental monitoring for
airborne BTAs operates in the detect-to-warn mode (using
the definition provided here) but lacks some of the critical
elements needed to support a rapid response, namely adequate
data or demonstrated approaches to gather supplemental data
that can engender widespread confidence among public health
officials.
The detect-to-treat mode alerts public health providers of a
high-confidence exposure event and can trigger population-level
distribution of MCMs for post exposure prophylaxis if the scale
and geographic scope of the attack is reasonably understood. In
this mode, the presence of an air borne biological agent of interest
must be established with high confidence because MCMs (i.e.,
antimicrobials and vaccines) cannot be delivered to a population
based on inconclusive or false positive results. Population-level
treatment for an unconfirmed threat is too costly in logistics,
materials, and possible adverse health events. Adverse health
events (including fatalities) can occur as a result of potential
side-effects or adverse interactions with other medications in a
large, physiologically heterogeneous civilian population in which
an unknown number may also have varying degrees of immune-
suppression.
A major problem for either operational mode is the possibility
of detecting naturally occurring environmental organisms (e.g.,
Bacillus anthracis or Francisella tularensis) or genetic near
neighbors that are indistinguishable from the agent of interest
by the assays employed. For example, the microorganisms that
cause anthrax and tularemia are endemic in the U. S. and
can be found in environmental matrices such as soil and
Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology | www.frontiersin.org 3 October 2018 | Volume 6 | Article 147
Dunbar et al. Aerosol Monitoring for Biothreats
water, respectively, that can serve as sources of low numbers
of airborne organisms. However, the airborne concentrations
or the viability of these naturally occurring agents are likely
insufficient to cause human disease as suggested by the absence
of reported cases of inhalation anthrax and pneumonic tularemia
in areas where Biowatch is deployed. This is particularly
significant with F. tularensis because the infectious dose may
be <10 organisms (Jones et al., 2005). Close relatives (or
genetic near neighbors) of these microorganisms (particularly
F. tularensis) may occasionally be found on air collection filters
and detected by current assays resulting in false positive results.
The Biowatch program reported 149 false positives from 2003
to 2012 (Person and Currie, 2015). The occasional presence
of a close relative of a biological agent of interest in air
is particularly problematic for detect-to-treat environmental
monitoring because it increases the data required to distinguish
a natural phenomenon from a biological attack, or it forces the
use of thresholds that define a “positive” as a sample containing
an exceptionally large quantity of target material that is never
seen in natural aerosols. Additional data to define a “positive”
may include coordinated detection by widely dispersedmonitors,
more extensive and accurate genetic analysis of the captured
organism, and demonstration of viability of the organism. These
technical hurdles were recurring points of discussion by the
panel of experts in the course of developing recommendations
for improved or next generation environmental monitoring
systems.
Recommendation 1–Boost Stakeholder
Confidence by a Thorough Validation of
System Efficacy
Lack of confidence by stakeholders (e.g., public health officials)
in the performance of environmental monitoring is a significant
challenge. Like any clinical diagnostic device, the end-to-end
performance of an environmental monitoring system must be
thoroughly validated under relevant conditions and the benefit
must be unambiguous (Person and Currie, 2015). Each step of
the monitoring process has factors that can affect the overall
performance of the system. Inadequate validation, uncertainty
about false positive and false negative rates, lack of clarity about
the probability of detection (as a function of agent quantity
and the numerous factors that affect system performance),
insufficient event characterization, and uncertainty about degree
of consequence management mitigation engender skepticism
of the value of environmental biomonitoring. Consequently,
an end-to-end, statistically rigorous performance assessment
of currently fielded collection devices and their associated
sample processing and analytical methods is needed. Developing
performance standards in partnership with stakeholders should
be considered. End-to-end assessments offer the opportunity to
understand and explore possible improvements associated with
collection, stability, recovery, and analysis of target analytes.
Rigorous study design, sample selection, and statistical analysis
can provide confident and relevant estimates of false negative
and false positive rates that provide decision makers with crucial
information.
Recommendation 2–Develop a Different
Approach to Sample Collection to Simplify
Sample Processing
The use of conventional filters for the collection of aerosol
samples poses several problems for the efficient detection
of biological agents. First, the pore size of conventional
filters is ill-suited to capture cell-free, non-aggregated protein
toxins. This leaves a gap in surveillance of BTAs of interest.
Second, conventional filters are not compatible with automated
procedures for the extraction and detection of molecular
signatures from biological agents. The filters used in the Biowatch
program, for example, must be manually cut and folded to fit
into tubes for sample processing. The requirement for manual
filter-processing increases logistical and cost burdens while also
creating potential for cross contamination of samples. Potential
alternatives for conventional filters include dissolvable filters and
liquid aerosol collection. However, these alternatives need to be
further evaluated to determine if they support the intended use
and application.
Dissolvable filters offer a near-term solution to the processing
obstacles encountered with the conventional filters that are
currently used for aerosol sample collection. Water-soluble filter
materials (e.g., gelatin; Burton et al., 2007 or alginate; Lauer and
Masters, 1988) are available but are problematic because (a) they
can dissolve during aerosol collection under conditions of high
humidity and, (b) they can render sample processing buffers
too viscous. A recently developed filter material that dissolves
in high concentrations of a chaotropic salt solution is currently
being evaluated for use in forensics applications and pathogen
detection systems (Luna Inc)1 and should be evaluated as a
replacement for conventional filters used for aerosol collection.
Liquid collection is another potential solution for autonomous
detectors designed to perform both aerosol collection and sample
processing. Liquid collection systems are problematic for long
collection periods due to evaporation issues. However, if aerosol
collection for environmental surveillance shifts to the short
collection intervals needed for timely warning, liquid collection
might be a compelling solution to simplify processing, improve
toxin collection, and facilitate recovery of viable organisms if
proper osmolarity conditions can be maintained.
Another area that may bring improved signature acquisition
is the development of new filter materials or concentration
approaches that improve the recovery of nucleic acid signatures.
Loss of nucleic acid signatures during aerosol collection or
sample processing is an ongoing concern for detection sensitivity.
Loss of nucleic acid signatures may arise from degradation of
the molecules during sample collection or from mechanisms
that reduce signature recovery such as spontaneous cross-linking
of glycosylated proteins to DNA or presence of co-collected
materials that reduce the efficiency of DNA recovery during
the extraction process. Approaches that stabilize RNA and DNA
signatures and maximize recovery may increase the range of
1Available online at: http://lunainc.com/forensic-swabs-perform-needed-
criminal-investigations/
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recoverable agents (e.g., RNA viruses) and their likelihood of
detection.
Recommendation 3–Develop Methods to
Recover Viable Agents and Functional
Toxins From Aerosols
Confirming the viability of an aerosolized pathogen is
unnecessary for environmental monitoring in the detect-to-warn
mode, but it is essential for surveillance in the detect-to-treat
mode. Viability confirms that a BTA of interest was detected
that can potentially cause infection. It also enables antibiotic
susceptibility testing to confirm the appropriate antibiotic(s) for
prophylaxis. An integrated system does not currently exist for
routine surveillance of air borne organisms or toxins of interest
and simultaneous confirmation of agent viability or toxicity.
In currently existing environmental monitoring systems, for
example, a 24-h period of collection results in cell desiccation and
possibly additional stresses such as denaturation of proteins that
pose substantial challenges for the recovery of viable organisms
and active toxins. Given that surveillance in detect-to-treat mode
can reduce morbidity and mortality to a much greater degree
than in detect-to-warn mode, developing an effective approach
to reduce the loss of viable pathogens and toxins during aerosol
sampling would be a valuable investment.
Any approach to recovering and documenting viable, non-
sporulating biological agents and active toxins of interest must
address two major problems: (a) desiccation-related loss of
viability or stability; and, (b) ability to rapidly distinguish a viable
BTA of interest from other viable cells that may be present in a
sample.
Although desiccation resulting in cellular destruction or
protein denaturation is commonly believed to be the cause of cell
death and loss of toxin activity in aerosol samples, dehydration is
a common method used for long-term preservation of microbial
cells or toxins. In aerosol samples, cell death may occur from
the rapid re-hydration of cells during assays for viability (Crowe
et al., 1992). During dehydration, the cell membrane transitions
to a crystalline state. The disorderly transition of the membrane
from a crystalline state back to a semi-fluid state during abrupt
re-hydration can cause membrane leakage, resulting in cell death
(Crowe et al., 1992). Thus, gentle re-hydration procedures may
substantially increase recovery of viable cells in aerosol samples
(Crowe et al., 1992). Use of membrane stabilizers or devices
that promote gentle rehydration may substantially increase
recovery of viable cells directly from aerosols or from aerosol
collection filters. However, this requires further evaluation.
Aerosol samplers that collect samples directly into a liquid
medium may be an alternative solution if proper osmolarity can
be maintained to prevent osmolysis. Rapidly distinguishing a
viable BTA in an aerosol sample from other viable background
microorganisms is a more challenging problem for which there
is no obvious solution at present. Although the viability of
vegetative cells can be determined rapidly by staining and
microscopy, the BTAs in a complex mixture cannot be identified
by cellular morphology. More broadly, the viability of BTAs can
be determined by cultivation, but the lack of selective media
that enable exclusive cultivation of BTAs means a screening
method must be applied subsequently to detect viable BTAs in
a background of other viable organisms.
Recommendation 4–Abandon Outdoor
Monitoring and Focus on Indoor and
Special Event Monitoring
For an outdoor, city-wide environmental surveillance system
to achieve an acceptable level of detection sensitivity, a denser
spatial network of detectors is needed. A denser network
would increase the likelihood of detection by: (i) increasing
the probability that one or more detectors are close to the
point source where the released agent concentrations are
highest, and (ii) increasing the probability that at least one
detector will capture an event despite changing air-flow patterns.
A denser network would also improve the likelihood that
multiple detectors document an event, which can facilitate the
characterization of the magnitude and spatial coverage of an
event. However, the cost of denser networks is expected to make
outdoor environmental surveillance prohibitive. Consequently,
the panel recommended abandoning outdoor monitoring
because, as currently practiced, outdoor environmental
monitoring seems unlikely to achieve its operational goal
(Person and Currie, 2015) and therefore does not justify the cost.
Environmental monitoring indoors and at special events is
more tractable owing to the more constrained spatial scale
and is consistent with the scale of past attacks (Guillemin,
2011; National Research Council, 2011) and threat assessments.
Current technology is more likely to succeed in these settings
owing to the tighter spatial focus and the absence of wind,
precipitation, and other environmental variability that can easily
confound outdoor environmental monitoring. If an indoor or
special event attack occurs, the greater proximity of detectors to
the point source and a more controlled environment increases
the probability of capturing a detectable amount of target
material. It should be noted that shifting to indoor monitoring
does not preclude the detection of large-scale outdoor releases
because the composition of outdoor aerosols contributes to the
composition of indoor aerosols (Meadow et al., 2014; Adams
et al., 2015; Miletto and Lindow, 2015; Ruiz-Calderon et al., 2016;
Wilkins et al., 2016).
Recommendation 5–Reduce Monitoring
Costs by Developing a Reagent-Less
Sensor That can Triage Aerosol Samples in
Real-time, Identifying a Smaller Set of
‘Suspect Aerosol Samples That Merit
Testing With Conventional Real-time PCR
Assays
The current concept of a 24-h collection period followed
by laboratory-based analysis of samples by PCR creates
unacceptable delays and costs. The delay in detection can be
as long as 36 h, due to the aerosol collection period, retrieval,
transport interval, and analysis time (Person and Currie, 2015).
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Automated sample collection and testing can reduce the time-
to-results to 6 h, but is projected to substantially increase costs
because of increased use of consumables for DNA extraction
and PCR assays (Person and Currie, 2015), wear and tear of
the platform from extensive use, and temperature regulation
to maintain reagent integrity. To solve this problem, detectors
are needed that reduce costs required for reagents, maintenance
and replacements of units, and the extensive engineering to
avoid reagent-damaging temperature variation. Reducing assay
volumes through use of microfluidic is a potential incremental
solution, although tradeoffs in detection sensitivity and potential
clogging during movement of fluids would require evaluation.
A transformative solution to reducing operational costs is the
development of a system that includes a reagent-less, real-
time detector able to triage aerosol samples to substantially
reduce the number of samples that require sophisticated testing.
This is a formidable technical challenge that requires continued
investment.
Several approaches employing mass spectrometry (MS) have
been suggested as potential technologies for a reagent-less
bioagent sensor (National Research Council, 2005; National
Academy of Sciences, 2011, 2013), but thus far no single method
has proved effective in providing the specificity and accuracy
needed for routine use. Furthermore, the data observed in
many peer-reviewed efforts use simple mixtures or even pure
samples of target organisms, which do not reflect the real-
life situations where samples contain hundreds of organisms
and diverse biological materials. The MS techniques that have
been investigated include pyrolysis MS (Tripathi et al., 2001;
Wilkes et al., 2006), pyrolysis-derivatization MS/MS (Griest
et al., 2001), derivatization gas chromatography GC-MS (Jeong
et al., 2014), aerosol laser ablation (LA) MS (Fergenson et al.,
2004), and aerosol matrix assisted laser desorption/ionization
(MALDI) MS (Jung et al., 2014). The high cost, generally
large footprint, and power requirements (mostly because of
vacuum pumps) are factors that have limited the application
of MS in autonomous detection devices. At present, the
MS-based methods have inadequate specificity for definitive
identification as well as low sensitivity, which limits their
use for environmental monitoring. The complexity of the
microbial background in aerosols reduces detection specificity,
and the potentially low numbers of target microorganisms affects
the detection sensitivity in some MS formats. To date, the
application of MS in environmental monitoring has generally
focused on its use as a stand-alone, definitive identification
tool. The group felt that this family of technologies has not
been explored in a systematic way for use as a trigger—that
is, a reagent-less device capable of sample triage, triggering
the use of more sophisticated PCR analysis for a reduced set
of suspect aerosol samples. If a cost effective and reagent-less
MS instrument can be identified as a suitable trigger system,
this option may warrant further investigation. A comprehensive
study to summarize peer-reviewed literature for all known
spectroscopic instrumentation for the detection of biological
agents, including technical specifications for each, information
about how well they work, and how economical they are when
used in actual practice is in order. These data can then be used to
assess how spectroscopic-based instruments could be integrated
with current biological detection technologies, outlining the
strengths and weaknesses of the detection mechanisms in
the context of agent-agnostic detection and potential use of
multiplexed (multiple types of spectroscopy combined) detection
configurations for the detection of biological agents.
Raman spectroscopy has been evaluated as a potential
technology platform for a reagent-less environmental monitoring
system (Ronningen and Bartko, 2009; National Academy of
Sciences, 2013; Kusic´ et al., 2014; Schultz et al., 2014; Zhou et al.,
2014; Baritaux et al., 2015; Hlaing et al., 2016; Stöckel et al.,
2016; Gao et al., 2017; Lorenz et al., 2017). This approach relies
on the notion that target biological agents exhibit reproducible
Raman profiles that are sufficiently distinct from the profiles of
material routinely observed in aerosols, enabling triage of aerosol
samples (i.e., discrimination of “suspect” aerosol samples from
a large volume of non-relevant samples). In one example of a
Raman-based aerosol-monitoring device, aerosol particles are
collected through impaction onto a metallic tape and screened
for Raman profiles of potential interest (Ronningen and Bartko,
2009; National Academy of Sciences, 2013). Fields with profiles
of interest are further interrogated by Raman spectroscopy and
compared against a proprietary reference database of biological
threat agents, offering the possibility of rapid screening and
extensive hands-free operation at low cost (Ronningen and
Bartko, 2009; National Academy of Sciences, 2013). The principle
of acquiring samples on continuous metal tapes is interesting
because it facilitates the display of possible targets in a much
less crowded field, reducing the number of interfering particles
(other organisms) for spectral analysis. Additionally, since the
impacted metallic tape is not destroyed, additional testing can be
done using laboratory based methods (e.g., PCR and sequencing)
and evidence preserved for future use. Like MS-based detectors,
conventional Raman-based detectors require a large quantity of
aerosolized target material for detection, which limits their value.
While the speed and simplicity of Raman-based sample screening
is very attractive, Raman or other spectroscopic platforms require
extensive testing and evaluation to understand suitability for
environmental monitoring in terms of its sensitivity, specificity
and robustness. Such characterization should consist of carefully
designed validation studies conducted with relevant biological
materials under realistic field conditions, and include evaluation
of both the primary (Raman) and confirmatory/secondary (PCR)
assays. An unexplored concept is to augment a Raman platform
with additional types of spectroscopy instrumentation to fill in
the spectral blanks that occur from use of Raman spectroscopy
alone.
CONCLUSIONS
Our recommendations are consistent with those from prior
expert panels that evaluated environmental surveillance for
biodefense (National Research Council, 2005; National Academy
of Sciences, 2011, 2013). Although a perfect surveillance system
(immediate detection and event characterization, exquisite
sensitivity, zero false positives or negatives) to detect biological
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agents of interest is not feasible owing to technical and
resource limitations, a system to detect and mitigate the most
serious attack scenarios is conceivable. A robust surveillance
system requires a combination of public health surveillance and
environmental monitoring. Public health surveillance can detect
the full range of attack scenarios, but is generally viewed as
insufficient to substantially mitigate consequences of bioweapons
that rapidly induce illness and death. With suitable research to
support the operational and technical recommendations above,
a reliable environmental monitoring system can be developed
to detect the most serious scenario, i.e., a large-scale bioaerosol
release with a high fatality rate. The scenarios of greatest
concern are those that target locations with high population
density. High population densities are linked to specific facilities
and special events. Therefore, a shift from general outdoor
surveillance to specific indoor and special event surveillance
is compelling and likely to increase successful detection. To
perform environmental monitoring at an acceptable cost, it is
essential to develop a triggered sensor that can greatly reduce the
number of samples subjected to time-consuming and expensive
assays. Proper validation of the system and transparency about
detection efficacy can engender greater confidence of public
health officials and other stakeholders.
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